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Shea trade has experienced huge growth since the early
2000s. During 2000–05, total shea exports increased by 35%
in nut weight equivalent (Yinug & Fetzer, 2008). In Burkina
Faso, the value of shea nut exports increased threefold during
2000–05 and sevenfold during 2005–12 (data from the General
Directorate of Customs—Direction Ge´ne´rale des Douanes).
The globalization process has had a major impact on the
organization of most tropical agro-value chains, as well as
on the power of upstream actors. Globalization is “widely
agreed to be a process that transforms economic, political,
social and cultural relationships across countries, regions
and continents by spreading them more broadly, making them
more intense and increasing their velocity” (Hopkins, 2002, p.
16 citing Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999). Struc-
tural adjustment programs (SAPs) ended international trade
agreements, led to the liberalization of national markets and
the privatization of former state monopolies, resulting in the
arrival of new actors and the “ﬁlamentation of chains”
(Gibbon, 2001). As stated by Mather (Fold & Larsen, 2008)
“in many export chains, governance has shifted from produc-
ers to buyers, with important implications for producers,
exporters and farm workers in African countries.” European
retailers, branded marketers, and international traders, have
become more involved in the control of the supply chain
(Daviron & Gibbon, 2002; Fold & Larsen, 2008; Gibbon,
2001; Gibbon & Ponte, 2005). Moreover, in the cocoa, coﬀee,
and even banana chains, the 1990s and 2000s were character-
ized by oversupply and low prices. All of which reduced the
power of upstream actors of the chain.
It is diﬃcult to compare the shea value chain with other
export-oriented tropical value chains because the latter are
mostly plantation crops (coﬀee, cocoa, banana, ﬂowers, vege-
tables, etc.), whereas shea is a non-timber forest product. The
shea value chain is thus original compared to the global fea-
tures of agro-food value chains in Africa. In the shea nut value413chain in western Burkina Faso, market globalization has had
only a weak impact on the restructuring of the regional supply
chain despite the boom in the shea trade and the arrival of
leading foreign ﬁrms. The main impact of globalization of
the shea nut value chain has been on prices and volumes.
The quality standard, organization, and governance of the
value chain have barely been aﬀected.
Following Gereﬃ, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005), we stud-
ied the organization of the shea value chain using transaction
cost literature. This paper is based on two approaches: the glo-
bal value chain (GVC) approach (Gereﬃ & Korzeniewicz,
1994) and the transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975). A
GVC can be deﬁned as “a set of inter-organizational networks
clustered around one commodity or product, linking house-
holds, enterprises, and states to one another within the world
economy” (Gereﬃ & Korzeniewicz, 1994). The GVC perspec-
tive is a way of conceptualizing the forms economic activities
take when they are subject to globalization. The GVC litera-
ture focuses on the question of governance of the chains, i.e.,
how they are organized and managed (Gereﬃ, Humphrey,
Kaplinsky, & Sturgeon, 2001). The GVC approach seeks to
understand how coordination and control are exercised by
some actors in the chain (lead ﬁrms) over others (Gibbon &
Ponte, 2005; Raikes, Friis Jensen, & Ponte, 2000). The transac-
tion cost literature helps understand the form the governance
of the value chain takes by analyzing the complexity of
coordination problems facing the chain (Gereﬃ et al., 2005).
Following Rammohan and Sundaresan (2003) and Wardellaccepted: September 13, 2014.
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value chain approach.
We examined the eﬀects of the globalization process on the
global value of the shea nut chain. The upstream shea supply
chain in Burkina Faso has been maintained by wholesalers for
many decades and one goal of the present study was to explain
their organization and maintenance of the chain at the regio-
nal scale in western Burkina Faso. We demonstrate that the
drivers of the organization of the value chain can be found
in speciﬁc coordination problems of shea trade.
In this article, we focus on the shea value chain and the mar-
keting of raw shea nuts for manufacturers of Cocoa Butter
Equivalent (CBE), irrespective of the use of the shea when it
is processed abroad (part is sold to cosmetics industries). In
West Africa, shea destined for the CBE agri-food value chain
represents 90% of shea exports (Lovett, 2004; Yinug & Fetzer,
2008). We do not include artisanal and industrial shea butter
processed for cosmetic purposes as this represents only 10%
of exports. This chain concerns mainly women’s groups who
produce shea butter under certiﬁcation for niche markets in
the cosmetic component of the value chain. This chain is most
visible outside Burkina Faso. It conveys a positive image of a
fair value chain that empowers women. And, as such, it is
much better documented than the main chain that accounts
for 90% of the shea nut trade. Our choice to focus on the
raw shea nut chain enabled us to ﬁll a gap in our knowledge
of the functioning of this chain that typically involves a huge
number of rural poor in the Sudano-Sahelian region and is
crucial for their livelihood (Neumann & Hirsch, 2000;
Pouliot, 2012). We demonstrate that wholesalers, despite their
oligarchic organization, play an important role in the smooth
functioning of the chain and in the sharing of beneﬁts down
the chain to the rural poor. We suggest that companies or
NGOs dealing with shea should consider the role of wholesal-
ers in the chain and in the empowerment of rural poor more
carefully and not try to bypass them in the laudable goal of
increasing the beneﬁts for the rural poor with a high risk of
excluding some small scale producers, as has been demon-
strated in other value chains (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000;
Gibbon, 2003).2. OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBAL SHEA VALUE CHAIN
The shea tree (Vitellaria paradoxa) is indigenous to the sav-
annas and dry forests of the Sudanian region. It is found in a
5,000-km-long belt that crosses West Africa (Figure 1). Shea
trees are usually not planted but selected, saved, and protectedFigure 1. Map of the shea tree distribution across Africaby farmers in their ﬁelds (Boﬀa, 1999; Chevalier, 1946; Lovett
& Haq, 2000; Vuillet, 1915). The shea tree is the most frequent
parkland tree species in Burkina Faso (Fischer, Kleinn,
Fehrmann, Fuchs, & Panferov, 2011). Shea fruit is generally
collected by women between May and August, ﬁrst they pulp
the fruit to retrieve the nut, and then boil or smoke the nuts.
Dry nuts can be stored for several months before being crushed
to release the kernel. International companies are interested
only in shea kernels, which they call “shea nuts”. In the present
work, we also use the term “shea nuts” for “shea kernels”.
Although the nuts are sold for export, shea butter processed
from shea kernels (Elias & Carney, 2007) has traditionally been
and still is the main source of lipids in the local diet in rural
areas (Cre´lerot, 1995; Lamien, Sidibe´, & Bayala, 1996).
It is estimated that about half the production of shea nuts is
traditionally self-consumed in producer countries: between
57% (Lovett, 2004) and 41% (Reynolds, 2010). It is diﬃcult
to get a clear picture of this balance. Neither national nor
international statistics concerning shea exports and produc-
tion are reliable. FAO data are based on imprecise national
statistics: national statistical monitoring systems fail to deliver
comprehensive data for export by road. Nonetheless, it
appears that West Africa currently exports between 265,000
and 445,000 tons of shea per year in nut weight equivalent
(Yinug & Fetzer, 2008). The main exporters of shea products
are Ghana, Burkina Faso, Benin, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Mali,
and Togo (Lovett, 2004; Terpend, 1982). West Africa accounts
for 99.8% of total exports of shea. The small remaining share
comes from the eastern part of the belt as shown in Figure 1.
The main outlet for shea is CBE industries. Shea butter has
similar chemical and physical properties to cocoa butter but
costs less. In addition, it is used to help maintain the texture
of chocolate, its hardness, “snap” and bright exterior, to pre-
vent the forming of fat bloom, and improve heat resistance
(Fold, 2000). CBE industries absorb 90% of total shea exports
fromWest Africa. The cosmetic and pharmaceutical industries
absorb the remaining share (Lovett, 2004; Yinug & Fetzer,
2008). The CBE market has undergone huge growth since
2000. Western Europe is the main market for CBE, and the
EU decision to allow 5% of CBE in chocolate (Directive
2000/36/CE, application August 3, 2003) has had some impact
on the market. However, the growth of the CBE market is
mainly driven by new markets such as Eastern Europe, Russia,
Brazil, and Oceania (Yinug & Fetzer, 2008). During 2000–05,
the global CBE market increased by 29% (Reynolds, 2010;
Yinug & Fetzer, 2008). In about the same period, total exports
of shea in nut weight equivalent increased by 35% (Yinug &
Fetzer, 2008).(Salle´, Boussim, Raynal-Roques, & Brunck, 1991).
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A marginal 5% of shea export was processed into crude shea
butter in West Africa. In 2005, approximately 26% of shea
export was in the form of crude butter (Yinug & Fetzer,
2008), which rose to 35% in 2010 (Reynolds, 2010). In the
meanwhile, IOI Loders Croklaan (the second world exporter
of shea) moved from a strategy of shea nut export to a strategy
of crude shea butter export from industrial plants in West
Africa (see also Figure 5).
Although small compared to CBE, West African exports of
shea for cosmetic purposes are estimated to have increased
from 200 tons/year in 1994 to 1,500 tons/year in 2003
(Lovett, 2004). Approximately half the supply of shea butter
to the cosmetic industries comes from CBE and agri-food
industries (Boﬀa, 1999; Elias & Carney, 2007), thus connecting
the two branches of the value chain (Chalﬁn, 2004).
These major changes in the value chain led to an increase in
shea exports as well as to an increase in price. Reynolds (2010)
estimated that shea exports increased from 50,000 tons a year
in 1994 to 350,000 tons a year in 2008. The export value of shea
nuts in Burkina Faso was two billion CFA francs in the early
2000s and reached nearly 10 billion CFA francs in 2012 (Figure
2). In current CFA francs, the price per kilogram paid to the
producer in Burkina Faso was seven CFA francs at the end
of the 1960s, between 40 and 50 CFA francs in the 1980s,
and up to 130 CFA francs in 2003. Prices boomed in 2007 to
reach 460 CFA francs. At the end of the marketing year
2013, the price of shea nuts was 250 CFA francs per kilogram.
As a consequence of the expansion of shea markets, export-
ers adopted strategies to secure their sourcing by establishing
branches as close as possible to the ﬁeld to manage the supply
chain and better control key actors. To this end, three main
CBE manufacturers, AAK (AarhusKarlshamn AB, Sweden),
IOI Loders Croklaan (IOI group, Malaysia), and 3F (Foods
Fats and Fertilizers Ltd., India), opened branches in Bobo-
Dioulasso (Figure 5) during 2000–05. The choice of
Bobo-Dioulasso and the western part of Burkina Faso was
motivated by the volume and quality of nuts available in this
area. One of the CBE manufacturers we interviewed told us
that every year between 50% and 70% of West African shea
nut exports come from Burkina Faso, most from western
Burkina Faso. Although the supply chain covers the entire18 000
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Figure 2. Export value of shea nuts from Burkina Faso. Sources: FAO and
General Directorate of Customs, Burkina Faso.shea ecological area, western Burkina Faso appears to be
the regional hub for the West African shea market.3. DATA AND METHODS
As state institutions have failed to monitor the shea value
chain, no reliable data on stakeholders involved in the chain
were available and random sampling was consequently impos-
sible. Instead we selected informants based on a snowball
eﬀect, starting from the top of the pyramid and moving to
the bottom to be sure of covering the diversity of actors in
the chain (Table 1). We started by interviewing the best known
traders in each of the 13 provincial capitals in western Burkina
Faso (Figure 3) and asked them to give us the name and
contact information of other stakeholders they knew either
as partners or competitors. Data were collected at the end of
the 2012–13 marketing year. In total, we interviewed 194 trad-
ers. Although our panel is not a random sample, we are con-
ﬁdent that it is a reasonably accurate representation of the
actual range of shea traders.
A brief historical review of the organization of the shea
value chain in Burkina Faso was conducted through inter-
views with former actors in the chain and with retired traders.
Available data from government archives were also reviewed.
Additional surveys of NGOs, support structures for women’s
groups, trade associations, and governmental agencies were
also conducted.
It proved diﬃcult to obtain shea export ﬁgures from CBE
manufacturers due to the competition between them and their
culture of secrecy. CBE manufacturers consider this to be stra-
tegic information. The ﬁgures presented in this paper on
exports of shea nut by CBE manufacturers and other export-
ers (Figure 5) are consolidated data from interviews with trad-
ers concerning the marketing year 2012–13. We asked traders
one level below the exporters how many shea nuts they sold to
exporters. As our sampling of this category of traders was
exhaustive (they are at the top of the pyramidal trading net-
work), this method provided us with a good proxy for the
quantity shea exported by each exporter. This ﬁrst estimation
facilitated dialog with some of the CBE manufacturers who
afterward acknowledged that our data were in agreement with
their own estimate of market shares in western Burkina Faso.4. STRUCTURE OF THE VALUE CHAIN IN WESTERN
BURKINA FASO
(a) The pyramidal shea nut supply chain
The shea value chain in Burkina Faso is a pyramidal supply
chain. Shea export for CBE use is controlled by a few big CBE
manufacturers in Burkina Faso (see also Figure 5). In 2010,Table 1. Distribution of traders interviewed as a function of the volume in
tons (V) of shea nuts sold in the marketing year 2012–13 (nine values are
missing)
V > 20,000 (large exporters) 4 2%
1,500 6 V 6 10,000 19 10%
800 6 V < 1,500 20 11%
250 6 V < 800 25 14%
100 6 V < 250 26 14%
40 < V < 100 23 13%
20 6 V 6 40 22 12%
V < 20 44 24%
Total 183 100%
Bobo-
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Diébougou
Gaoua
Batié
Dano
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Figure 3. Map of Western Burkina Faso with the 13 provincial capitals
surveyed.
416 WORLD DEVELOPMENTthe three main exporters (AAK, IOI Loders Croklaan, and
3F) accounted for an estimated 95% of the buying market
share for export and AAK dominated the market with around
60% of the market share (Reynolds, 2010). This estimate is in
agreement with data we collected in western Burkina Faso.
Our surveys showed that the three main exporters accounted
for 89% of the buying market. The CBE industry is one with
high technical and ﬁnancial barriers of entry that relies on
advanced reﬁning and fat-splitting technologies. CBE manu-
facturers have a culture of secrecy to protect their technolog-
ical edge in a context of strong competition (Fold, 2000).
The three main CBE manufacturers all have similar sourcing
systems in western Burkina Faso: they have a contract with
and pre-ﬁnance wholesalers in Bobo-Dioulasso (2 or 3 for
IOI Loders Croklaan, 10 or 15 for AAK and 3F) who are then
entitled to purchase shea nuts on their behalf. At the next level
down, the wholesalers work with other traders in the pyrami-
dal system: they ﬁnance mid-level traders who, in turn, ﬁnance
small retailers, who buy shea nuts from village collectors. This
sourcing system can involve from three to six steps from the
collector to the exporter.
Wholesalers are deﬁned here as traders with a sales capacity
ranging from 1,000 tons to 5,000 tons of shea nuts per market-
ing year. They work directly with CBE manufacturers (see
wholesalers in Figure 4). According to our interviews, between10 and 15 of them are located in Bobo-Dioulasso and less than
ﬁve are located in the other towns in western Burkina Faso.
Thanks to the CBE manufacturers, the wholesalers pre-ﬁnance
between 10 and 50 mid-level traders in Bobo-Dioulasso and in
other regional towns in the western part of Burkina Faso (such
as Banfora, Gaoua, and De´dougou). Most of them can only
source shea in western Burkina Faso, although a few are
national in scope.
Mid-level traders can sell from 500 tons to 1,000 tons of
shea nuts per year. There are many mid-level traders:
between two and 10 in each provincial capital, and many
more in Bobo-Dioulasso, where they supply wholesalers.
Their purchasing areas cover from one to several provinces
but no more than a region. They work with retailers, who
are small traders who sell from 20 tons (250 bags) to 500
tons of shea per year. Retailers are numerous. All the shop-
keepers in the majority of villages are involved in small scale
cereal and shea trading. They work at the provincial scale
and buy shea from the ‘de´brouille´s’, small village traders or
local farmers who are only involved in shea nuts during
the shea marketing period. The ‘de´brouille´s’ source
shea directly from the farms or small rural markets. The
‘de´brouille´s’ trade less than 250 bags per marketing year.
They work in one or several villages at the municipal scale
and cover the countryside and every local periodic market.
Periodic markets are held throughout West Africa with vary-
ing frequencies usually every 3, 4, or 5 days.
With this pyramidal system, the entire regional territory is
covered by traders. During our interviews, which covered
the whole of western Burkina Faso, we did not ﬁnd a single
producing area devoid of traders who purchased shea nuts.
Most of the wholesalers we interviewed and the majority of
the other traders were also actively involved in the cashew
nut and sesame trade. Smaller traders at the local scale were
also involved in the cereal trade.
The price of shea nuts varies widely over the course of the
marketing year and traders do not keep accounts. It is conse-
quently diﬃcult to estimate the gross margin in the value
chain. In 2012–13, the price in Bobo-Dioulasso began at 75
CFA francs per kilogram in July 2012 and ended the season
at 275 CFA francs per kilogram in April/May 2013. It is also
likely that margins vary throughout the year depending on
contracts between CBE manufacturers and wholesalers.
Table 2 shows two examples of the distribution of gross mar-
gins between traders in the pyramidal system. The data pro-
vided here are examples of the variation in gross margin we
observed among traders and during the course of the market-
ing year. Despite the variation, margins appear to be quite
equitably shared between actors in the chain. The fair distribu-
tion of revenues earned by actors in the chain can be seen as a
signal of a sustainable value chain (Schaafsma, Burgess,
Swetnam, Ngaga, Kerry Turner, & Treue, 2014). As a low-
value high-volume market, it is the volume of shea traded that
makes the diﬀerence in business income.
(b) The shea value chain and the upheavals of state regulation
and globalization
The pyramidal organization of shea sourcing controlled by
wholesalers has not changed much since the colonial period,
in contrast to other export-oriented global tropical value
chains. It has survived the upheavals associated with both
national and global coordination of the value chain in the last
50 years. Four distinct periods can be distinguished in the his-
tory of the shea value chain in Burkina Faso from the early
1900s.
AAK
IOI*
3F
Ghana**
Bobo**
Ouaga**
India**
Olvea
*IOI Loders Croklaan
**Undefined traders from Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso,
Other shea transactions
Transactions to IOI*
Transactions to AAK
Transactions to 3F
Transactions to Olvea
IOI and its wholesalers
AAK and its wholesalers
3F and its wholesalers
Olvea
Other shea traders
Ghana and India
Figure 4. Shea nut transactions between traders in western Burkina Faso in the marketing year 2012–13. Data were collected during interviews with 194
traders and represent 318 transactions between 215 traders (Source: Author’s survey, 2013). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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French colonies were already exporting shea nuts and shea
butter in the early 1900s. By 1910, the Haut–Se´ne´gal–Niger
colony had started exporting shelled kernels rather than whole
nuts. This improvement led to an increase in kernel exports,
from 25 tons in 1910 to 243 tons in 1911 (Perrot, 1915).
Margarine manufacturers were the ﬁrst outlet for shea exports
(Pe´haut, 1973). In the 1920s, irregularities in consignments
and inconsistent product quality hindered expansion of the
export market. After the Second World War, the main obsta-
cles—high local consumption of shea, the low price for collec-
tors, and transport diﬃculties—remained, and shea exports
dropped from 1947 to 1958 (Pe´haut, 1973).
During this period, colonial trading ﬁrms often bartered
local products for manufactured goods and salt. This
exchange system relied on a hierarchical network of local trade
posts working with local traders. CITEC, CFAO, CICA,
CFCI, and SCOA were the main colonial trading ﬁrms oper-
ating in the Republic of Upper-Volta 1 (according to our inter-
views and to archive data from Burkina Faso 2). It relied on
old regional trading networks. It is probable that the pyrami-
dal system of shea sourcing existed before the colonial era and
was supported by colonial trading ﬁrms (Wardell & Fold,
2013). During this early period, Voltaic wholesalers were
not, however, at the head of the regional chain.
(ii) 1956–84: state regulation
In 1956, to put an end to marked ﬂuctuations in shea prices
French West Africa (AOF) created a price stabilization fund
(caisse de stabilisation des prix) but low shea production in
the late 1950s counteracted these endeavors and the fund
was liquidated in 1959 (Pe´haut, 1973). In the aftermath of
independence, another attempt based on the former Stabiliza-tion Fund was made by the new government of the Republic
of Upper-Volta to control the shea nut value chain. In 1960,
a marketing board (OFCOM, oﬃce de commercialisation des
produits) and in 1964 a stabilization fund (the CSPPA, Caisse
de stabilisation des prix des produits agricoles) were created. 3
The aim of these parastatal ﬁrms was to guarantee maximum
exports. 4 In the 1960s and 1970s, OFCOM and CSPPA set the
prices to be paid to the producer and the entire costs and mar-
gin of traders. They also provided authorization to traders.
The CSPPA supply system relied on the supply organization
established by the colonial trading ﬁrms. Registered traders
working with a hierarchical network of retailers supplied the
CSPPA. 5 According to a former CSPPA civil servant who
had become a traders’ representative, up to 150 traders were
authorized by the CSPPA, among whom 15 were able to
export large quantities of shea. But despite the country’s inde-
pendence, colonial trading ﬁrms were still powerful in the
1960s (OFCOM, 1965). As a result a group of 60 Voltaı¨c trad-
ers joined forces to form the GEX (Group of Exporters,
Groupement des EXportateurs) with the aim of bypassing colo-
nial trading ﬁrms and exporting directly (according to an
interview with a former trader who belonged to GEX). New
national trade ﬁrms supported by foreign ﬁrms gradually
replaced the former colonial trading ﬁrms. By the mid-1970s,
colonial trading ﬁrms had almost all withdrawn from shea
trade in the Republic of Upper Volta. The summit of the pyra-
midal supply chain in western Upper Volta was subsequently
controlled by wholesalers from Bobo-Dioulasso, the origin
of the sourcing organization that remains today.
Controlling the supply chain of shea was not an easy task
for parastatal organizations. In 1965, OFCOM noticed that
many traders were functioning outside its formal authoriza-
tion system and were paying prices above those they had set
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Figure 5. Shea nut value chain from western Burkina Faso. Volumes of shea nuts are in tons for the marketing year 2012–13. IOF and Ghana Specialty Fats
did not process shea in 2012–13. (Source: Author’s survey, 2013.)
418 WORLD DEVELOPMENT(OFCOM, 1965). It was acknowledged that the quality man-
agement system had failed. The premium from the bonus/pen-
alty system based on quality criteria remained in the traders’
pockets and did not reach producers. Although buying sesameand groundnuts became a parastatal monopoly in 1968, the
government chose to let Voltaic traders buy shea directly from
the producers. 6 The monopoly of the CSPPA was further
weakened in 1974. Traders were allowed to sell their surplus
Table 2. Two examples of the distribution of the gross margin in the value chain of shea nuts, in CFA francs per kilogram. Source: Authors’ survey, 2013
Actors 1st example, March 2013a 2nd example, May–June 2013b
Purchase pricec Sales pricec Gross margin Purchase price Sales price Gross margin
Farmer – 112.50 112.50 – 196.43d 196.43
Collector (village) 112.50 125.00 12.50 196.43d 214.29d 30.95
Retailer (provincial capital) 125.00 140.63 15.63 214.29d 235.00 35.00
Mid-level trader (provincial capital/Bobo-Dioulasso) 140.63 155.00 14.38 235.00 250.00 15.00
Middleman (Bobo-Dioulasso) – – – 250.00 255.00 5.00 + 2.5e
Wholesaler (Bobo-Dioulasso) 155.00 No data – 255.00 260.00 5.00
a Exchange rate: US$ 1 = 505.11 CFA francs in March 15, 2013.
b Exchange rate: US$ 1 = 505.59 CFA francs in May 29, 2013.
c Prices in CFA francs per bag have been converted into CFA francs per kilogram (in the region, one bag of shea nuts corresponds to 80 kg of nuts).
d Prices in CFA francs per box have been converted into CFA francs per kilogram (one box of shea nuts corresponds to approximately 1.4 kg of nuts).
e CBE manufacturers usually give a sales dividend (called “ristourne”) to their wholesalers at the end of the marketing season, this ranges from 2.5 CFA
francs per kilogram to 5 CFA francs per kilogram depending on their total nut sales.
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Traders’ representatives also participated in price ﬁxing and
in monitoring the marketing activities of the CSPPA.
In the 1960s, cocoa butter equivalents were introduced and
spread across the market. Until then, the main buyers had
been Aarhus United (Denmark) and Unilever (UK). Accord-
ing to Terpend (1982), this oligopoly locked the shea market
in West Africa until the arrival of Japanese ﬁrms (Fuji Itoh
and Mitsu Bishi) in the early 1960s. 7 During this period,
shea exporters in West Africa operated through representa-
tives in the ports of Abidjan, Tema, and Lome´, but not in
the Republic of Upper Volta. According to our interviews,
they relied on international and regional traders, such as
Kagnassy, Kassardjian, and AFRICO, and preferred to
pay an additional margin rather than being involved in
sourcing themselves.
Finally, CBE manufacturers had great leeway to maintain
low prices, even in the period of state monopoly, since state
prices were pegged to international prices. The network of
traders created by colonial trading ﬁrms remained in place
after the departure of the ﬁrms and the closer intervention
of OFCOM and CSPPA. Throughout the 30 years of CSPPA
eﬀorts to control the chain, a small number of national and
regional traders acquired the power to directly export their
products, reinforcing the pyramidal system of supply. The
CSPPA failed to control the prices ﬁxed by the wholesalers,
or their margins and organization, while the wholesalers took
advantage of the funding provided by the CSPPA.
(iii) 1984–2003: the “Sankara crisis” and the liberalization of
the shea market
The drop in cocoa prices in 1983–84 (Fold, 2001) had a neg-
ative eﬀect on the CBE market since the CBE was no longer as
ﬁnancially attractive for chocolate manufacturers. As a result,
in the second half of the 1980s, trade in shea slowed down. It
was in this context that the revolutionary government of Tho-
mas Sankara came to power and, in the hope of changing the
rules of the aid and trade games, triggered a huge shea crisis:
traders withdrew from the shea trade and no outlet was found
for the accumulating stocks of shea nuts. Shea nuts of two or
more marketing seasons were mixed and the quality of Burkin-
abe shea nuts dropped considerably. Sankara’s government
decided to burn the shea stock to restore international traders’
conﬁdence in Burkinabe shea nuts. 8 The government paid for
the burnt stock but at low prices, and traders suﬀered major
losses. Conﬁdence was not restored and in the following years
the market remained depressed.The crisis resulted in the bankruptcy of the CSPPA, which
stopped buying shea nuts. The state regulation of the shea
value chain collapsed six years before oﬃcial liberalization.
According to our interviews with traders, the shea crisis at this
period had at least three eﬀects on the national value chain:
– new wholesalers, but with the new ones coming from the
same families: with their losses, some stopped, others
handed over their businesses to the next generation in
their families;
– disorganization of the supply chain: with the depressed
market for shea nuts, Burkinabe traders had diﬃculty
reaching exporters and attempts at smuggling shea were
unsuccessful;
– traders diversiﬁed toward sesame and, to a lesser extent,
cashew nuts; hence, the relative importance of shea in the
regional trader’s activities decreased.
Two international traders, Olam and Kagnassy (L’Aiglon
Holding SA), entered the fray oﬀered by the liberalization pro-
cess and the disorganization of the value chain. According to a
former Olam manager in Burkina Faso, Olam managed to
become a key trader between regional and national wholesal-
ers and the (then) ﬁnal buyers, that is to say Loders (Unilever
group), Karlshamn AB, Aarhus United and Fuji. 9 Olam, and
to a lesser extent Kagnassy, leveraged the situation with high
margins until 2003. Olam and Kagnassy relied on the same
pyramidal system used by CSPPA and the colonial ﬁrms.
The wholesalers’ sourcing system recovered from the crisis
with the arrival of Olam and Kagnassy, who relied on the sys-
tem to source shea.
(iv) 2003–present: involvement of CBE manufacturers in sourc-
ing activities
The CBE market has experienced huge growth since the
early 2000s. Exporters set up in the shea-producing region,
particularly in western Burkina Faso with the desire to reduce
the number of middlemen in the chain and the traders’ margin.
They also sought to better control the supply. According to
Fold (2000), CBE manufacturers wanted to maximize perfor-
mance of the sourcing of shea because the margins of their
other activities had been reduced. According to our interviews,
they apparently noticed that the market was not as sensitive to
price ﬂuctuations as they thought it should be. Increasing the
price was not synonymous with increased amounts of shea
nuts sold because traders in the ﬁrst stages of the chain, the
wholesalers, kept the increase for themselves. As the increase
in price did not reach the farmers, it was not an incentive
for them to collect more shea nuts. To acquire better control
420 WORLD DEVELOPMENTof the market, CBE manufacturers set up in West Africa. They
deposed Olam and worked directly with national and regional
wholesalers.
Instead of decreasing the size of the pyramid to better con-
trol production quality and prices, as they had expected upon
arrival, CBE manufacturers strengthened the pyramidal net-
work controlled by the wholesalers. With the increase in the
price of shea nuts and the arrival of several CBE manufactur-
ers, many new actors entered the shea nut value chain. Ghana-
ian and Indian traders came to Burkina Faso to smuggle or
simply to buy shea nuts without formal contractual agree-
ments. The changing context and the new rule of trade with
CBE manufacturers upset long-established shea traders. Mar-
gins in the shea trade changed. According to a trader who
began to trade shea nuts in the 1970s, margins have decreased
from 15% to 3–4% while the amount of shea traded has
increased. As a consequence, the wholesalers’ network of trad-
ers became less stable since wholesalers were working with new
traders but trusted them less. The arrival of CBE manufactur-
ers reshuﬄed the hierarchical order between wholesalers.
Some long-standing traders were edged out but others man-
aged to continue under these new conditions. CBE manufac-
turers mainly strengthened the vantage point of wholesalers
who were already working directly with international traders
(Olam, Kagnassy) but they also empowered some other whole-
salers. Nevertheless, the wholesalers who now enjoy a privi-
leged position in the supply chain are not newcomers. They
belong to old regional traders’ families who used to work with
powerful wholesalers, but at a lower level. Finally, the pyrami-
dal supply chain of shea survived the upheaval of shea global-
ization. The same organization of sourcing controlled by
wholesalers in Bobo-Dioulasso during the colonial period con-
tinues today.
(c) New positioning of wholesalers and CBE manufacturers
Based on our interviews with exporters, IOI Loders Cro-
klaan and AAK 10 have tried to bypass wholesalers and the
multi-level middlemen in their system and work directly with
women’s groups. In the direct procurement systems imple-
mented by the two ﬁrms, the stated objectives are to ensure
higher prices to collectors, to avoid speculation and to con-
trol quality and traceability. At the same time, purchasing
nuts directly from women is viewed as a cost-reduction
opportunity for exporters. Direct sourcing is intended by
CBE manufacturers to be a win–win situation: women would
receive a higher price for shea (pocketing part of the former
middlemen’s margin) and exporters would pay less than the
wholesaler’s price since the total margin was reduced. Other
incentives have led CBE manufacturers to set up an alterna-
tive shea supply. It appears that AAK is doing so to fulﬁll its
own standards or the private standards of speciﬁc customers
in the cosmetics industry. It does not appear that IOI Loders
Croklaan’s decision to work with women’s groups and oblige
its wholesalers do so, is in response to customers’ require-
ments. Rather, they may want to ensure their own sustain-
ability (corporate social responsibility) which is an implicit
but critical requirement to work with large agri-food indus-
tries. Still, despite our limited access to the CBE manufactur-
ers’ strategy, we are in a position to state that the two
systems of direct sourcing likely account for only a small
amount of shea compared to the “classic” system, perhaps
no more than 5% or 10% of their total purchase of shea nuts
in western Burkina Faso. Our ﬁeldwork leads us to conclude
that CBE manufacturers cannot obtain better ﬁnal prices for
shea through their direct sourcing than those oﬀered bywholesalers, although they may be able to purchase better
quality shea nuts. Women’s groups seek a premium price
for getting involved in alternative marketing systems. More-
over, in this supply system, CBE manufacturers have addi-
tional costs of leadership, management, and logistics. In
light of this information, it appears that direct supply is
costly and not very eﬃcient. To date no exporters have suc-
ceeded in buying large amounts of shea through this system
and still rely to a great extent on the wholesalers’ supply
chain.
Wholesalers still take advantage of their relationships with
global exporters, as it is the only way to gain access to funding,
although they try not to become captives of this system.
Wholesalers and their networks can bypass exporters. As
can be seen in Figure 4 most of the traders work with several
buyers. Shea traders speculate on shea using stocks they pur-
chased with their own capital. They also manage to sell shea
on the “black market” (le marche´ noir, which in this case is
not illegal trade, but refers to trade without a contract), which
pays a better price. They smuggle shea into Ghana where
prices are higher. It is likely that wholesalers are not in an
exclusive relationship with CBE manufacturers despite the
eﬀorts of CBE manufacturers.
Finally, although CBE manufacturers maintain exclusive
control over shea nut outlets and have bypassed international
traders acting as middlemen in order to ensure hands-on man-
agement of the supply chain, wholesalers have succeeded in
maintaining their position as unavoidable key players in the
shea supply chain at the regional scale. Like colonial traders
and the state marketing board after them, CBE manufacturers
have been forced to rely on this oligarchy of wholesalers and
their networks, despite their claims that their arrival in
Bobo-Dioulasso gives them better control of the trade and
of funding ﬂows to the rural poor.5. ANALYZING THE CONTINUITY OF THE WHOLE-
SALERS’ SUPPLY SYSTEM
How have wholesalers been able to maintain their position
over time? We contend that wholesalers control the speciﬁcity
of the shea value chain in western Burkina Faso. The organi-
zation they built has solved coordination problems in the shea
chain in an eﬃcient way to enable them to maintain their posi-
tion in the value chain.
(a) Coordination problems and transaction costs of the shea nut
supply chain
To analyze the organization of the shea chain and its coor-
dination issues, we examined the transaction costs of the
chain with the aim of (i) identifying the speciﬁcity of the
existing value chain and (ii) comparing these costs with those
of possible alternative shea chains. We deﬁne transaction
costs as “the resource costs of maintaining and operating
the institutional framework associated with capturing the
gains from trade” (Allen, 2000; Wallis & North, 1986).
Transaction costs vary depending on the uncertainty of the
transaction, the frequency of the transaction, and asset spec-
iﬁcity, i.e., investments that are speciﬁc to the product
(Williamson, 1979). The latter is critical: the more speciﬁc
the asset, the more the buyer is locked into the transaction
through speciﬁc investments (Williamson, 1981). Transaction
costs also arise from coordination problems, deﬁned as the
problem of integrating the separate eﬀorts of many individu-
als (Grant, 2002).
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As observed by Barrett (1997) and Fafchamps and Minten
(2001), coordination problems and hence transaction costs
are high in agricultural trade in Africa. The smallholder crop-
ping system is characterized by atomicity of supply, small
transactions, the long distances between sellers and buyers—
compounded by poor quality roads—, and the diﬃculties of
enforcing formal contracts with smallholders. The shea nut
chain shares similar features. Shea production mainly belongs
to the peasant economy. In the shea production area in Burk-
ina Faso, virtually every rural household can collect and sell
shea. A recent survey in two rural shea-producing areas
showed that 94% of households collect shea nuts and 59% sell
them (Pouliot, 2012). Research in Mali has also demonstrated
the signiﬁcance of shea nuts to household incomes controlled
by women representing more than half of all incomes (Becker,
2001). In contrast to cocoa or coﬀee growers, shea collectors
are not well organized. Groups are mainly women who simply
join forces to process and sell shea butter or soap. Collecting
and selling raw nuts is still conducted by individuals or fami-
lies, predominantly by women. This distinctive feature of the
shea production system is a serious challenge for the supply
chain: to meet the logistic challenges of bundling atomized
production across large rural areas.
Another huge coordination problem that is speciﬁc to the
shea value chain is the variability of shea production. The
year-to-year yield of shea trees is irregular (Desmarest,
1958). In the same year, production can be unevenly distrib-
uted between areas. Traders have to be able to source shea
yearly in diﬀerent areas depending on production.
The pyramidal supply chain is designed to tackle these prob-
lems of producer atomicity and yield variability: the system
allows shea nuts from large areas to be bundled, each trader
bundles the shea at his/her own level. In light of our inter-
views, it is likely that local traders represent several thousand
people and that, through the pyramidal system, shea can be
sourced almost everywhere. However, to be fully operational,
this supply system requires cash. Traders cannot wait to be
paid. They have to buy shea throughout the marketing period
with no interruption due to the volume of the shea market.
The pre-ﬁnancing system works only if any risk of mistrust
in the network can be overcome. The risk of mistrust thus rep-
resents another major coordination problem.
The need for local knowledge of units of sale is also a coor-
dination problem that is speciﬁc to the shea chain (Fold, 2008,
p. 114). Shea nuts are primarily bought in volume units: boxes,
‘yoruba’ or ‘cocotassa’, depending on the region. When the
transactions take place in provincial towns, traders usually
buy shea by the kilogram. Traders must have a good knowl-
edge of volume equivalents in weight as their margin relies
on this knowledge. In addition, shea nuts lose weight while
drying. At the beginning of the marketing period they are still
moist, but they can lose up to 20% of their weight during dry-
ing. Traders must also be able to judge the quality of the nuts
to adjust the price they pay based on the moisture content of
the product.
According to Laan (1993), shea nuts represent an “entire
channel crop”. “Entire channel crop” is a trans-oceanic export
crop that has no well-organized global market and only a
quasi price, that is to say, only retrospective prices. This sys-
tem can be contrasted with the “half-channel crop”, which is
a trans-oceanic export crop divided between auction crops
(tea, tobacco, etc.) and exchange crops (cocoa, coﬀee, etc.),
which have price quotations and well-organized global mar-
kets. In a half-channel crop, exporters do not need to control
the entire chain. They can rely on market institutions to buycrops (Laan, 1993). Entire channel crops involve more trans-
action costs than half-channel crops because the supply chain
to be controlled and managed is longer.
To sum up, the shea value chain is characterized by high
transaction costs. Even if asset speciﬁcity is low (raw nuts,
no need for high speciﬁc investment), shea nut transactions
are highly uncertain (no global market, high yield variability,
and risk of mistrust) and distinguished by their high frequency
(atomicity of producers and small transactions).
(ii) Examining alternative organizations of the shea nut chain
To compare two alternative organizations with the existing
chain, we investigated vertical integration and direct purchase
in order. Direct control of production, which exists in the
banana value chain where exporters are involved in produc-
tion in a vertical integration model (Laan, 1993; Vagneron
& Roquigny, 2011), is neither realistic nor likely to be proﬁt-
able. There are no shea plantations in existing agrarian sys-
tems. Although shea plantations are technically possible,
shea seeds are recalcitrant and the shea tree is a slow-growing
tree with highly variable yields. Under natural conditions, the
tree begins to bear at age 20, and full production is reached at
age 40 or 50 (Sanou et al., 2004). This is a major disincentive
for farmers to plant it. Grafting can make trees fruit younger
but it has not yet been applied at a large scale (Sanou et al.,
2004) and requires plantlets that will often have to survive
high livestock pressure. Another critical factor is the complex
bundle of rights to shea trees as distinct from rights to the land
on which shea trees grow (Fortmann, 1985). In Burkina Faso,
rights to shea trees and to land are distinct but intertwined.
Access to shea fruits may be open to some extent in bushes
and fallows; in the cultivated area, it may be shared between
the landowner and the farmer who has use of the land or
restricted to the landowner (Augusseau, Nikie´ma, &
Torquebiau, 2006; Elias, 2010). Pressure on shea harvesting
triggers change in access to shea toward more restriction to
some social groups and especially migrants (Benjaminsen,
2002; Elias, 2010). As establishing plantations of shea trees
may require new institutional tenure arrangements (Berry,
1988), planting shea is not yet part of existing agrarian sys-
tems; it raises problem of land tenure and involves the ques-
tion of social justice. For all these reasons, it would be
expensive and risky for CBE manufacturers to invest in shea
plantations in the present conditions. It would lock them into
the shea business for a long period of time whereas shea prof-
itability depends upon the (more) volatile cocoa butter market
(Fold, 2008, p. 111).
Direct procurement of shea nuts from small-scale farmers is
another possible alternative. As discussed above (Section 4(c)),
the direct supply of shea is relatively costly and ineﬃcient.
GVC analyses have shown that the trend toward a buyer-dri-
ven global value chain appears with higher quality standards,
timeframes for delivery, volumes, and perhaps also social and
environmental certiﬁcation and more control of the supply
chain, either by vertical integration or by direct procurement
(Fold & Larsen, 2008; Gibbon & Ponte, 2005; Riisgaard,
2009). This change in the organization of the supply chain
has already been reported, for instance, in fresh produce value
chains in East Africa (Barrientos, Dolan, & Tallontire, 2003;
Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; Jensen, 2008), the palm oil chain
in Ghana (Fold, 2008), the global coﬀee chain (Ponte, 2001),
and the citrus value chain in South Africa (Mather &
Greenberg, 2003). Quality monitoring and private standards
are key factors in the restructuring of the chains. Since 2008,
AAK has started to trade in Green Palm Certiﬁcates linked
to RSPO, although shea continues to remain outside all such
422 WORLD DEVELOPMENTvoluntary certiﬁcation systems. Moreover, in the agri-food
shea chain, quality is not an issue. CBE manufacturers inter-
viewed in West Africa stated that quality of raw nuts is not
critical for their industry and that there is no advantage in
paying a premium for top quality shea nuts. Current quality
is suﬃcient: traders have minimum quality requirements (6–
8% moisture, 5–8% free fatty acid, 47–48% oil content) and
CBE manufacturers use advanced technology to deal with
low-quality nuts. CBE manufacturers are trying to develop
direct procurement mainly for the cosmetics industry where
some strict standards apply although this segment represents
less than 10% of the global shea trade.
Alternatives to the pyramidal supply chain controlled by
wholesalers are thus costly and risky under present conditions,
given the speciﬁcity of the production structure of shea nuts
and the market requirements of CBE manufacturers.
(b) Wholesalers successfully tackle coordination problems
In contrast, the network trading developed by wholesalers
satisfactorily solves the problem of coordination in the shea
chain and lowers the transaction costs. This probably explains
their long-standing key position in the shea value chain in wes-
tern Burkina Faso. Coordination problems are tackled by
wholesalers through the market institution they have built:
network trading. The network appears to be their best asset
to control their numerous suppliers and deal with the risk of
mistrust. Trust is a powerful way to prevent free-riding, to
reduce uncertainty, and to establish common values and
shared goals between partners (Me´nard, 2010, p. 33–34). To
ensure relations based on trust their trade networks are based
on relatives and distant kinships. Kinship networks are an
essential resource since they enable wholesalers to control a
large number of traders. As one trader put it: “it is the strength
of the network that makes a trader powerful.” Younger broth-
ers, sons, cousins, or other relatives are sent to rural towns to
manage local networks. They provide pre-ﬁnancing to local
traders, obtain the corresponding amount of shea and convey
it to the parent company in Bobo-Dioulasso. It is very likely
that traders prefer to rely on other traders of the same geo-
graphical origin. Table 3 shows that autochthones are more
likely to trade smaller volumes of shea than Mossi traders,
who are considered to be migrants. They may think that other
Mossi traders will act according to shared cultural rules.
Moreover, Mossi shea traders share the same religion, Islam.
It is likely that sharing Islam is another safeguard for traders,
religion acting as a trade code of ethics (Gre´goire & Labaze´e,
1993; Lambert & Egg, 1994). The social homogamy of traders
may also be explained by the way traders are renewed:Table 3. Descriptive statistics, traders of shea nuts in western Burki
Distribution of traders according to the volume (V) of shea nuts in tons fo
Chi-squared test: v-squared = 6.3326, df = 2, p-value = 0.04216
0 < V < 40 (%) 44 < V
Autochthones 49 30
Migrants 32 30
Total 37 30
Distribution of the traders according to the volume (V) of shea nuts in tons f
116 traders, Pearson’s Chi-squared test: v-squared = 7.9725, df = 2, p-valu
Old network 24 34
New trader 50 23
Total 33 30through co-optation and nepotism within the networks of
traders, as shown by Fafchamps (2001).
The age of the network is another factor that helps avoid
mistrust between traders. Old networks are stronger because
they have been tried and tested over time. Traders who could
not be trusted have been rejected. Traders’ relatives are
strongly rooted in local areas. Old networks are an important
asset for wholesalers. The inheritance of the shea trade and
trade network is made possible by training young men in the
family. They learn the job “in the ﬁeld” by purchasing nuts
at the base of the pyramid. Then, more experienced men begin
to manage small local supply networks before being entitled to
set up independent businesses and possibly inherit the parental
trading company. Table 3 also shows that traders who inherit
the trading network from their families are likely to have a lar-
ger trading capacity than new traders. This result is in agree-
ment with that of Fafchamps and Minten (2001), who
showed that traders’ social capital has a positive inﬂuence
on trader performance by reducing transaction costs.
In addition, it appears that stronger networks are also based
on territorial links. Traders have better control over their
home district, where they are well known, even in the case
of Mossi traders. They are still viewed as migrants even two
or three generations after settling in the western part of Burk-
ina Faso. As a trader told us “if you go to your home village,
traders will prefer to sell shea nuts to you rather than to
foreigners, for the same price.”Network trading is thus an eﬃ-
cient way of dealing with a major coordination problem, the
risk of mistrust in the pre-ﬁnancing operation.
The organization of the trade gives traders another advan-
tage, which, as mentioned above, is learning by doing. This
type of training allows the transfer of “tacit knowledge”
(Pecqueur, 2006; Polanyi, 1967). This means their trade skills
and knowledge are not learned from books or at school, but
rather through learning by doing. In order to transfer tacit
knowledge, inter-ﬁrm relationships are crucial, or, in our case,
intra-family trade relationships (Giuliani, Pietrobelli, &
Rabellotti, 2005). Our interviews showed that it is not unusual
for even an experienced wholesaler to suﬀer a loss in certain
transactions. Wholesalers contend that a minimum of three
years’ training is needed to understand how the shea market
works. Young traders learn how to convert a price in volume
into a price in weight by doing it, to know how a market price
develops and when prices become remunerative depending on
moisture content and anticipated weight loss, how to judge
transport costs, and how to set incentive commissions for
lower traders. Hence, wholesalers reduce the importance of
another coordination problem, the lack of information on
quantity, quality, and prices of shea nuts, by establishing ana Faso, marketing year 2012–13 Source: Author’s survey, 2013
r the marketing year 2012–2013, and origin—154 traders, Pearson’s
< 245 (%) V > 250 (%) Total (%)
21 100
38 100
33 100
or the marketing year 2012–13, and type of network (inherited or not)—
e = 0.01857
42 100
28 100
37 100
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& Foss, 2003).
Large networks throughout western Burkina Faso make it
possible for wholesalers to purchase shea nuts where the yield
is high. In the early stages of the season, they use their young
relatives in the ﬁeld and the traders in their network to identify
areas where the yield is expected to be high and then focus
their eﬀorts on these areas.
The organizational structures of West and East African
grain value chains are similar to those of shea (Galtier, 2002;
Lambert & Egg, 1994; Sitko & Jayne, 2014). The eﬃciency
of the organization of transactions, such as network trading
within the shea value chain, must be assessed with respect to
the coordination problems it overcomes (Galtier, 2002;
Gereﬃ et al., 2005). Network trading, as developed by whole-
salers, appears to be the most eﬃcient institution for the shea
trade and similar trades today.
(c) Horizontal organization of shea traders
Cooperation among wholesalers (at the top of the pyramid)
makes it possible to maintain wholesaler supply chain organi-
zation. Tacit knowledge acts as a rule for cooperation within
the group and thus prevents opportunistic behavior
(Lorenzen & Foss, 2003). Wholesalers use tacit knowledge as
a smooth barrier to entry into the cluster. It also enables them
to develop horizontal cooperation among themselves. They are
organized in trade organizations more or less according to their
ﬁnal buyers (AAK vs. IOI Loders Croklaan) and in federations
at the national level (TFK—Table Filie`re Karite´). Through the
TFK, they lobby the government and CBE manufacturers.
They recently lobbied to stop foreign traders from buying shea
at the farm-gate level. This eﬀort has, up to now, remained
unsuccessful. They are also trying to get the TKF recognized
as an interprofession, that is to say, the only professional orga-
nization of the shea value chain recognized by the State and
entitled to create and collect a tax linked to the shea trade. They
are also capable of setting prices among themselves to ensure
their margins. For example, in August 2013, they blocked an
increase in prices. CBE manufacturers had not increased their
purchasing prices and at the local level farmers wanted to sell at
higher prices. Wholesalers found themselves in the diﬃcult
position of facing reduced margins. They agreed on a lower
purchasing price. Their horizontal coordination is thus part
of their strength. It appears to be an eﬃcient way of socially
reproducing the wholesalers’ dominant position within the
shea nut supply chain in western Burkina Faso.6. DISCUSSION: STABILITY OF THE WHOLESALERS’
SUPPLY SYSTEM
(a) Vertical coordination of the shea value chain
The vertical coordination of the shea value chain is complex
and unique. Vertical coordination appears when the transac-
tion costs are too high for market-controlled coordination
and too low for vertical integration (Humphrey & Schmitz,
2001). Shea nut transactions are mostly conducted through
contracts between CBE manufacturers and selected wholesal-
ers and through network trading between traders. As for other
value chain analysis (Ivarsson & Alvstam, 2010), the shea
value chain does not fall obviously in one of the types of gov-
ernance developed in the GVC literature. Nevertheless, the
typology deﬁned by Gereﬃ et al. (2005) helps to understand
the vertical coordination of the shea value chain. It is situatedbetween the relational value chain and the captive value chain.
The shea value chain can be seen as a network built up over
time, based on complex interactions and trust, with some
mutual dependence between buyers and sellers, as in the rela-
tional value chain. Yet, suppliers are also dependant on larger
buyers, the CBE manufacturers, as in the captive value chain
type of vertical coordination. Shea traders and CBE manufac-
turers are situated between mutual dependence and a leader–
captive relationship. Although CBE manufacturers set up
contract with suppliers and deﬁne quantities and prices, shea
traders are unavoidable because they control the up-stream
supply chain. As stressed by Morris and Staritz (2014) in the
apparel industry in Madagascar, the local embeddedness of
the shea GVC matters when analyzing its distinctive features.
Despite the attempt by the CBE manufacturers to introduce
strong vertical coordination, local wholesalers have been able
to maintain their position and to keep some power in their
relations with CBE manufacturers.
(b) Stability of wholesalers’ supply system
The reason for the resilience of the wholesalers’ supply chain
over time is twofold: their strong and eﬃcient coordination
and the absence of satisfactory alternatives.
First, wholesalers and their networks appear to play a useful
role in the shea value chain. In spite of their limited role in
speculation, each trader has a useful function in the chain in
collecting and bundling shea nuts and thus creating added
value at local and regional levels. Sharing fair margins may
be seen as supporting evidence for the relevance of the whole-
salers’ supply network. Their relevance and their usefulness in
the chain have certainly helped them to maintain their posi-
tion. Up to now, they have solved the coordination problems
of the chain eﬃciently enough to maintain their power over
the supply chain. Our results show that it may have been the
high transaction costs of the shea value chain that allowed
the wholesalers to control the supply chain.
The wholesalers’ strategy, their skills, and their distinctive
features, i.e. involving their family and maintaining territorial
links, facilitated the development of a horizontal organization
very similar to clusters (Mccormick, 1999; Porter, 2000). Shea
traders are long-standing traders in Bobo-Dioulasso, which
has been a regional hub for the shea trade since before colonial
times. Most shea wholesalers (51% of traders we interviewed
in Bobo-Dioulasso) are settled in a Bobo-Dioulasso neighbor-
hood named “diaradougou”. An even closer resemblance to
clusters can be seen if, like Pecqueur (2006), we consider that
clusters value hidden resources linked to spatial particularities
and human groups: more than capital, work, or raw materials,
clusters value a local culture, cognitive learning, and training.
As we have seen, cognitive coordination is one of the strategic
assets wholesalers use to reinforce trust and information shar-
ing among themselves. Figure 4 shows that traders cooperate
horizontally. The networks of transactions are intertwined.
According to Lorenzen and Foss (2003), clusters facilitate ver-
tical and horizontal coordination, thereby explaining the lon-
gevity of wholesaler supply systems. This double organization
appears to be a successful local means for the regional supply
system to cope with globalization processes.
The second explanation for the wholesalers’ control of the
supply chain could be the failure of the alternative supply solu-
tions tried by CBE manufacturers, or the lack of new alterna-
tives. As demonstrated, vertical integration is neither realistic
nor would it be proﬁtable. Quality requirements for shea nut
transactions are low and voluntary standards have not
been introduced for shea nuts, whereas elsewhere, they are
424 WORLD DEVELOPMENTkey drivers of the restructuring of value chains toward more
direct sourcing of other commodities (Fold & Larsen, 2008;
Gibbon & Ponte, 2005; Riisgaard, 2009). This is also the case
in the cosmetic segment of the shea value chain where quality
requirements have changed in line with the interests of
branded manufacturers including L’Occitane, The Body Shop,
and L’Ore´al. Certiﬁcation has become a way to diﬀerentiate
products and justify premium prices. Branded manufacturers
purchase shea butter directly from women’s groups or work
with manufacturers whose source of shea nuts is from
women’s groups. The organization of the value chain is expe-
riencing rapid change. In the shea value chain for CBE, at the
global scale, the leading ﬁrms have not changed, nor have their
buyers or quality requirements. Shea is still completely invisi-
ble to consumers and is of little interest to the ﬁnal buyers
(branded manufacturers) (Fold, 2008). Thus, product diﬀeren-
tiation according to origin or quality and certiﬁcation has not
been applied in the agri-food shea value chain.
The wholesalers’ organization of the shea trade has proven
useful, eﬃcient, and stable because it resolves speciﬁc coordi-
nation problems and facilitates the development of horizontal
coordination links. Still, one may question the longevity of
such an organization. To what extent could the conditions
that allow wholesalers to maintain control over the chain
shift? Their organization has proved to be resilient up to
now. So far, due to the shea tree ecology and the complexity
of land and tree tenure, it is diﬃcult to imagine industrial-scale
plantations of shea trees will threaten the wholesalers’ organi-
zation in the medium term. If changes do occur, they are more
likely to aﬀect the visibility of shea and certiﬁcation and stan-
dards. Up to now, shea butter products are hidden behind the
term “vegetable oils”. By the end of 2014, the EU will require
mandatory labeling of what type of vegetable oil is used in
agro-food products. 11 Consequences for the shea agri-food
value chain are diﬃcult to foresee. If mandatory labeling
implies stricter social and environmental requirements by the
ﬁnal buyers, it may also entail a shift in the organization of
the shea value chain. Is the wholesalers’ organization suﬃ-
ciently resilient to support a change of this kind? Wholesalers
are worried about the possible generalization of the model
value chain developed by the cosmetics industry that bypasses
them to directly empower women. Even though the generaliza-
tion of this model to the entire shea value chain would be
costly, our interviews showed that wholesalers are lobbying
to maintain their positions in the future.
7. CONCLUSION
The globalization of the shea value chain has inﬂuenced
both the volume and price of shea nut exports in the past ﬁf-
teen years. However, the organization of the shea value chain
at the regional level has been maintained. For more than50 years, a handful of wholesalers have controlled the multi-
level networks of local shea nut traders. We contend that inter-
national traders and manufacturers have not succeeded in
gaining control over the upstream supply chain of shea nuts
due to the inherent features of the shea nut supply. We have
demonstrated that wholesalers may have survived the upheav-
als of the globalization process by being organized in a way
that enables them to overcome the main coordination prob-
lems of the shea supply chain. Their prolonged existence relies
on two forms of cooperation: vertical cooperation within each
individual wholesaler’s network and horizontal cooperation
between wholesalers, the central nodes of the networks. The
lack of eﬃcient alternative organizations and the unchanged
low quality requirements for shea nuts have also facilitated
the maintenance of this organization.
From a development perspective, whereas the government
and NGOs are focusing most of their actions on the women’s
groups who produce shea butter and on certiﬁcation for niche
markets (the cosmetics segment), the most important stakes in
terms of development and poverty alleviation are in the raw
shea nut chain for the agri-food market, where the producers
are predominantly individual women members of the rural
poor. This study provides development stakeholders with
key insights into the structure and the governance of the shea
value chain that targets agri-food industries. Our ﬁndings sug-
gest that the traders who are situated between farmers and
exporters cannot be simply seen as free riders. They are useful
and relevant players in the shea value chain, and create value
at both local and national levels. As a consequence, the role of
wholesalers in the functioning of the chain and the empower-
ment of the rural poor needs to be reassessed. Industries and
NGOs involved in the shea trade should consider traders
and their political and social roles more carefully. Trying to
bypass them even if with the laudable goal of empowering
marginal social groups entails a risk of excluding other rural
poor who rely on their income from shea.
From a theoretical point of view, this study contributes to
the recent debates regarding governance of global value
chains. The shea value chain is a counter-example of the trend
toward more buyer-driven value chains. Although CBE man-
ufacturers, in the role of leading ﬁrms, have controlled the
manufacturing process and the downstream part of the value
chain while controlling prices and margins, wholesalers have
maintained a grip on the upstream shea value chain. This ﬁnd-
ing is signiﬁcant because it shows that national upstream
actors, such as traders, may be powerful when confronting
transnational companies. The distinctive features and the spe-
ciﬁc coordination problems of the value chain help understand
the organization of the chain. Our ﬁndings support the argu-
ment that the global value chain approach would gain from
being better integrated in the transaction costs theory.NOTES1. Previously called Republic of Upper Volta, the country was renamed
Burkina Faso in 1984 by President Thomas Sankara.
2. Archive document from the National Archive Center of Ouagadou-
gou, class number 17V104: Letter from Bernard Drissa Boni, president of
the central council of the OFCOM, to the heads of administrative
constituencies, November 4, 1962.
3. Decree No 506/PRES/MFAEP/AE of December 28, 1960 on the
organization of the OFCOM (de´cret ﬁxant l’organisation de l’oﬃce de
commercialisation des produits de Haute-Volta), and decree No. 081/PRES/CIM/DCI of February 4, 1964 creating the CSPPA (de´cret portant
cre´ation d’une Caisse de Stabilisation des Prix de la Haute-Volta).
4. Archive document from the National Archive Center of Ouagadou-
gou, class number 17V104: Letter from Bernard Drissa Boni, Minister of
Trade, Industry, Economic Aﬀairs and Mining, to divisional commanders,
January 7, 1963.
5. Archive document from the National Archive Center of Ouagadougou,
class number 17V104: Letter from B. Mathurin, head of administrative
COPING WITH THE UPHEAVALS OF GLOBALIZATION IN THE SHEA VALUE CHAIN 425constituency of Tanguin-Dassouri division of Ouagadougou, to the Minister
of Trade, Industry and Mining, January 14, 1964.
6. Archive document from the National Archive Center of Ouagadou-
gou, class number 31V113: Report by the select committee after
examination of the report of the working group on agriculture and trade
concerning problems related to the marketing of cash crops in Upper-
Volta (Compte-rendu de la commission restreinte d’examen du rapport du
groupe de travail agriculture/commerce sur les proble`mes lie´s a` la commer-
cialisation des produits de rente en Haute-Volta), June 7, 1968.
7. Archive document from the National Archive Center of Ouagadou-
gou, class number 1V477: Analysis of trade exchanges in Upper-Volta
1962–63–64 (Analyse des e´changes commerciaux de la Haute-Volta 1962–
63–64), undated.
8. The drivers of the crisis are uncertain. Archived data from the Sankara
revolution have been destroyed. According to our interviews, it appears
that several aspects may explain what happened. First, the government
may have wanted to reallocate shea nuts stocked by forwarders as part of
the self-suﬃciency program. Several traders state that their stocks of nutswere requisitioned to supply national crushing plants. In addition, it seems
likely that Sankara tried to impose better conditions on the national shea
trade and that CBE manufacturers preferred to withdraw. Moreover, the
last director of the CSPPA before the Sankara takeover told us that the
CSPPA had held speculative stocks of shea nuts whereas prices fell in
1984–85. Finally, bad stocks of shea nuts were burnt in 1987 to restore
buyer conﬁdence.
9. Archive document from the National Archive Center of Ouagadou-
gou, class number 11V91: Sub-regional workshop in Abidjan on the topic:
‘Production, processing and industrial use of the shea nut value chain in
the West African sub-region (atelier sous re´gional a` Abidjan sur le the`me:
production, transformation et valorisation industrielle de la ﬁlie`re amandes
de karite´ dans la sous re´gion ouest africaine), 1995.
10. Aarhus United and Karlshamns AB were merged in 2005 to become
AAK.
11. EU regulation no. 1169/2011 on vegetable oil labeling will apply
from December 13, 2014.
NCESREFEREAllen, D. W. (2000). Transaction costs. In B. Bouckaert, & G. De Geest
(Eds.), Encyclopedia of law and economics. The history and methodology
of law and economics (Vol. 1, pp. 893–926). Cheltenham, UK;
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub.
Augusseau, X., Nikie´ma, P., & Torquebiau, E. (2006). Tree biodiversity,
land dynamics and farmers’ strategies on the agricultural frontier of
Southwestern Burkina Faso. Biodiversity & Conservation, 15(2),
613–630. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10531-005-2090-8.
Barrett, C. B. (1997). Food marketing liberalization and trader entry:
Evidence from Madagascar. World Development, 25(5), 763–777.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(96)00132-5.
Barrientos, S., Dolan, C., & Tallontire, A. (2003). A gendered value chain
approach to codes of conduct in African horticulture. World Develop-
ment, 31(9), 1511–1526. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-
750X(03)00110-4.
Becker, L. C. (2001). Seeing green in Mali’s woods: Colonial legacy, forest
use and local control. Annals of the Association of American Geogra-
phers, 91(3), 504–526. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0004-5608.00256.
Benjaminsen, T. A. (2002). Enclosing the land: Cotton, population growth
and tenure in Mali. Norsk Geograﬁsk Tidsskrift – Norwegian Journal of
Geography, 56(1), 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/002919502317325722.
Berry, S. (1988). Property rights and rural resource management: the case
of tree crops in West Africa. Cahiers Des Sciences Humaines, 24(1),
3–16.
Boﬀa, J.-M. (1999). Agroforestry Parklands in Sub-Saharan Africa. Rome:
FAO. Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/X3940E/
X3940E00.HTM.
Chalﬁn, B. (2004). Shea Butter Republic: State power, global markets, and
the making of an indigenous commodity. New York: Routledge.
Chevalier, A. (1946). L’arbre a` beurre d’Afrique et l’avenir de sa culture.
Ole´agineux, 1, 7–11.
Cre´lerot, F. (1995). Importance of shea nuts for women’s activities and
young child nutrition in Burkina Faso: the case of the Lobi. PhD Thesis,
University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Daviron, B., & Gibbon, P. (2002). Global commodity chains and African
export agriculture. Journal of Agrarian Change, 2(2), 137–161. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1111/1471-0366.00028.
Desmarest, J. (1958). Observations sur la population de karite´s de
Niangoloko de 1953 a` 1957. Ole´agineux, 5, 449–455.
Dolan, C., & Humphrey, J. (2000). Governance and trade in fresh
vegetables: The impact of UK supermarkets on the African Horticul-
ture Industry. Journal of Development Studies, 37(2), 147–176. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/713600072.
Elias, M. (2010). Transforming Nature’s Subsidy: Global Markets, Burki-
nabe` Women and African Shea Butter. McGill University, Montre´al,Que´bec. Consulte´ a` l’adresse http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/
thesescanada/vol2/QMM/TC-QMM-94971.pdf.
Elias, M., & Carney, J. (2007). African shea butter: A feminized subsidy
from nature. Africa, 77(1), 37–62, http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/
afr.2007.77.1.37.
Fafchamps, M. (2001). Networks, communities and markets in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Implications for ﬁrm growth and investment. Journal
of African Economics, 10(90002), 109–142. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/
jae/10.Suppl2.109.
Fafchamps, M., & Minten, B. (2001). Social capital and agricultural trade.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83(3), 680–685.
Fischer, C., Kleinn, C., Fehrmann, L., Fuchs, H., & Panferov, O. (2011).
A national level forest resource assessment for Burkina Faso – A ﬁeld
based forest inventory in a semiarid environment combining small
sample size with large observation plots. Forest Ecology and Manage-
ment, 262(8), 1532–1540. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foreco.2011.07.
001.
Fold, N. (2000). A matter of good taste? Quality and the construction of
standards for chocolate products in the European Union. Cahiers
d’e´conomie et sociologie rurales, (55/56), 91–110.
Fold, N. (2001). Restructuring of the European chocolate industry and its
impact on cocoa production in West Africa. Journal of Economic
Geography, 1(4), 405–420. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeg/1.4.405.
Fold, N. (2008). Transnational sourcing practices in Ghana’s perennial
crop sectors. Journal of Agrarian Change, 8(1), 94–122. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2007.00164.x.
Fold, N., & Larsen, M. N. (2008). Globalization and restructuring of
African commodity ﬂows. Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
Fortmann, L. (1985). The tree tenure factor in agroforestry with particular
reference to Africa. Agroforestry Systems, 2(4), 229–251. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00147036.
Galtier, F. (2002). Information, institutions et eﬃcacite´ des marche´s. Analyse
de trois ﬁlie`res ce´re´alie`res d’Afrique de l’Ouest comme des “syste`me de
communication”. PhD Thesis, ENAM, Montpellier, France.
Gereﬃ, G., Humphrey, J., Kaplinsky, R., & Sturgeon, T. (2001).
Introduction: globalisation, value chains and development. IDS
Bulletin, 32(3), 14.
Gereﬃ, G., Humphrey, J., & Sturgeon, T. (2005). The governance of
global value chains. Review of International Political Economy, 12(1),
78–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290500049805.
Gereﬃ, G., & Korzeniewicz, M. (1994). Commodity chains and global
capitalism. Westport: Praeger.
Gibbon, P. (2001). Agro-Commodity Chains An Introduction. IDS
Bulletin, 32(3), 60–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-
5436.2001.mp32003007.x.
426 WORLD DEVELOPMENTGibbon, P. (2003). Value-chain Governance, Public regulation and entry
barriers in the global fresh fruit and vegetable chain into the EU.
Development Policy Review, 21(5–6), 615–625. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/j.1467-8659.2003.00227.x.
Gibbon, P., & Ponte, S. (2005). Trading down: Africa, value chains, and the
global economy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Giuliani, E., Pietrobelli, C., & Rabellotti, R. (2005). Upgrading in global
value chains: lessons from Latin American Clusters. World Develop-
ment, 33(4), 549–573. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.
01.002.
Grant, R. M. (2002). The knowledge-based view of the ﬁrm. In C. W.
Choo, & N. Bontis (Eds.), The strategic management of intellectual
capital and organizational knowledge (pp. 133–148). New York: Oxford
University Press.
Labaze´e, E., & Labaze´e, P. (1993). Grands commerc¸ants d’Afrique de
l’Ouest: logiques et pratiques d’un groupe d’hommes d’aﬀaires contem-
porains (Vol. 1-1). Paris, France: E´d. Karthala, E´d. de l’ORSTOM.
Held, D., McGrew, A. G., Goldblatt, D., & Perraton, G. (1999). Global
transformations politics, economics and culture. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Hopkins, A. G. (Ed.) (2002). Globalization in world history. London:
Pimlico.
Humphrey, J., & Schmitz, H. (2001). Governance in global value chains.
IDS Bulletin, 32(3), 19–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-
5436.2001.mp32003003.x.
Ivarsson, I., & Alvstam, C. G. (2010). Supplier Upgrading in the home-
furnishing value chain: An empirical study of IKEA’s sourcing in
China and South East Asia. World Development, 38(11), 1575–1587.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.04.007.
Jensen, M. F. (2008). Changing food safety requirements and the export of
fresh horticultural products by Kenyan smallholders. In N. Fold, & M.
N. Larsen (Eds.), Globalization and restructuring of African commodity
ﬂows. Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
van der Laan, H. L. (1993). Boosting agricultural exports? A “Marketing
Channel” perspective on an African Dilemma. African Aﬀairs, 92(367),
173–201.
Lambert, A., & Egg, J. (1994). Commerce, re´seaux et marche´s: l’appro-
visionnement en riz dans les pays de l’espace se´ne´gambien. Cahiers Des
Sciences Humaines, 30(1–2), 229–254.
Lamien, N., Sidibe´, A., & Bayala, J. (1996). Use and commercialization of
non-timber forest products in western Burkina Faso. In R. R. B.
Leakey, A. B. Temu, M. Melnyk, & P. Vantomme (E´ds.), Presented at
International Conference on Domestication and Commercialization of
Non-Timber Forest Products in Agroforestry Systems: Non wood forest
products (pp. 51–64), Rome: FAO.
Lorenzen, M., & Foss, N. J. (2003). Cognitive coordination, institutions
and clusters: an exploratory discussion. In D. Fornahl, & T. Brenner
(Eds.), Cooperation, Networks, and Institutions in Regional Innovation
Systems (pp. 82–104). Edward Elgar Publishing.
Lovett, P. N. (2004). The shea butter value chain. Production, transfor-
mation and marketing in West Africa (WATH Technical Report No.
2) (p. 52). WATH, USAID.
Lovett, P. N., & Haq, N. (2000). Evidence for anthropic selection of the
Shea nut tree (Vitellaria paradoxa). Agroforestry Systems, 48(3),
273–288. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006379217851.
Mather, C., & Greenberg, S. (2003). Market liberalisation in post-
apartheid South Africa: The restructuring of citrus exports after
“Deregulation”. Journal of Southern African Studies, 29(2), 393–412.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057070306210.
Mccormick, D. (1999). African enterprise clusters and industrialization:
Theory and reality. World Development, 27(9), 1531–1551. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(99)00074-1.
Me´nard, C. (2010). Hybrid modes of organization. alliances, joint
ventures, networks, and other “Strange” animals. Retrieved from
http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00624291.
Morris, M., & Staritz, C. (2014). Industrialization trajectories in Mada-
gascar’s export apparel industry: Ownership, embeddedness, markets,
and upgrading. World Development, 56, 243–257. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.10.030.
Neumann, R. P., & Hirsch, E. (2000). Commercialisation of non-timber
forest products: Review and analysis of research. Center for Interna-
tional Forestry Research. Retrieved from http://www.cifor.org/publi-
cations/pdf_ﬁles/mgntfp3.pdf.
OFCOM (1965). Rapport campagne 1964–1965 au 15 juin 1965. Haute-
Volta: Oﬃce de Commercialisation des Produits.Pecqueur, B. (2006). Le tournant territorial de l’e´conomie globale. Espaces
et socie´te´s, 124–125(2), 17–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/esp.
124.0017.
Pe´haut, Y. (1973). Les ole´agineux dans les pays d’Afrique occidentale
associe´s au marche´ commun: la production, le commerce et la
transformation des produits (The`se de doctorat). [s.n.], Bordeaux,
France.
Perrot, E´. (1915). Les grands produits ve´ge´taux des colonies franc¸aises:
e´tat actuel, avenir. (Exposition internationale du caoutchouc, E´d.)
(Vol. 1–1). Paris: Emile Larose.
Polanyi, M. (1967). The tacit dimension. NY: Anchor Books.
Ponte, S. (2001). The ‘Latte Revolution’? Winners and Losers in the
Restructuring of the Global Coﬀee Marketing Chain (CDR
Working Paper No. 01.3) (p. 1–35). Copenhagen: CDR Working
Paper.
Porter, M. E. (2000). Location, competition, and economic development:
Local clusters in a global economy. Economic Development Quarterly,
14(1), 15–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/089124240001400105.
Pouliot, M. (2012). Contribution of “Women’s Gold” to West African
livelihoods: The case of Shea (Vitellaria paradoxa) in Burkina Faso.
Economic Botany, 66(3), 237–248.
Raikes, P., Friis Jensen, M., & Ponte, S. (2000). Global commodity chain
analysis and the French ﬁlie`re approach: comparison and critique.
Economy and Society, 29(3), 390–417. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
03085140050084589.
Rammohan, K. T., & Sundaresan, R. (2003). Socially embedding the
commodity chain: An exercise in relation to coir yarn spinning in
Southern India.World Development, 31(5), 903–923. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/S0305-750X(03)00012-3.
Reynolds, N. (2010). Investing in shea in West Africa. A U.S. Investor’s
Perspective (WATH Technical Report No. 1) (p. 24). WATH, USAID.
Riisgaard, L. (2009). Global value chains, labor organization and private
social standards: Lessons from East African Cut Flower Industries.
World Development, 37(2), 326–340. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.world-
dev.2008.03.003.
Salle´, G., Boussim, J., Raynal-Roques, A., & Brunck, F. (1991). Le Karite´,
une richesse potentielle. Perspectives de recherche pour ame´liorer sa
production. Bois et foreˆts des tropiques, 228, 11–23.
Sanou, H., Kambou, S., Teklehaimanot, Z., Dembe´le´, M., Yossi, H., Sina,
S., et al. (2004). Vegetative propagation of Vitellaria paradoxa by
grafting. Agroforestry Systems, 60(1), 93–99. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1023/B:AGFO.0000009408.03728.46.
Schaafsma, M., Burgess, N. D., Swetnam, R. D., Ngaga, Y. M., Kerry
Turner, R., & Treue, T. (2014). Market signals of unsustainable and
inequitable forest extraction: Assessing the value of illegal timber
trade in the Eastern Arc Mountains of Tanzania. World Develop-
ment, 62, 155–168. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.
05.011.
Sitko, N. J., & Jayne, T. S. (2014). Exploitative briefcase businessmen,
parasites, and other myths and legends: Assembly traders and the
performance of maize markets in Eastern and Southern Africa. World
Development, 54, 56–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.
07.008.
Terpend, M.-N. (1982). La Filie`re karite´: Produit de cueillette, produit de
luxe. Paris: Les Dossiers faim-de´veloppement.
Vagneron, I., & Roquigny, S. (2011). Value distribution in conventional,
organic and fair trade banana chains in the Dominican Republic.
Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d’e´tudes du
de´veloppement, 32(3), 324–338. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2011.
622619.
Vuillet, J. (1915). Karite´. In E´. Perrot (Ed.), Les grands produits ve´ge´taux
des colonies franc¸aises: Etat actuel, avenir (pp. 285). Paris: Emile
Larose.
Wallis, J. J., & North, D. (1986). Measuring the transaction sector in the
American Economy, 1870–1970. In S. L. Engerman, & R. E. Gallman
(Eds.), Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth. Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, Retrieved from http://
www.nber.org/chapters/c9679.
Wardell, A., & Fold, N. (2013). Globalisations in a nutshell: Historical
perspectives on the changing governance of the shea commodity chain
in Northern Ghana. International Journal of the Commons, 7(2),
367–405.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust
implications: A study in the economics of internal organization. New
York: Free Press.
COPING WITH THE UPHEAVALS OF GLOBALIZATION IN THE SHEA VALUE CHAIN 427Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: The governance of
contractual relations. Journal of Law & Economics, 22, 233.
Williamson, O. E. (1981). The economics of organization: the transaction
cost approach author(s): Oliver E. Williamson. American Journal of
Sociology, 87(3), 548–577.Yinug, F., & Fetzer, J. (2008). Sub-Saharan Africa: Factors Aﬀecting
Trade Patterns of Selected Industries (No. Second annual report).
Washington, DC: United States International Trade Commission
(USITC).
.sciencedirect.comScienceDirect
Available online at www
